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By John I. Williamson, of the Missouri Bar.
One of the most pronounced characteristics of the trials of
cases, civil as well as criminal, formerly was the length of time
devoted to the argument of the law and the facts, by the attorneys
for the respective parties. I say formerly for effective argument
in the trial of jury cases, unless in exceptional instances, is rapidly
becoming a thing of the past.
It is a fashion which still survives in the country, although the
custom of putting a short time limit upon the arguments of coun-
sel is growing increasingly common even outside of the larger cities.
That the protracted argument of the earlier days had its faults,
and absurdities, cannot be denied. That much time was thus
used to little purpose is doubtless true. But it may well be ques-
tioned whether we are not, in the rush and hurry of latter day
court proceedings, especially in the cities, drifting to the other
extreme, with consequences more grave even than those which
attended the practice of unlimited argument.
With the increasing complexity of modern civilization, there
has developed a corresponding complexity in the rights which
the courts are daily called upon to determine. Evidence has
increased in volume, and relates more and more to matters which
lie more or less outside the experience of the average juror,
insomuch that expert testimony, formerly comparatively rare,
has become an incident of almost every trial. Out of this grow-
ing mass of evidence has evolved an increasing volume of rules of
evidence, and the fast-multiplying decisions of courts of last
resort have distinguished and refined upon these rules times with-
out number. Instructions have multiplied in number, increased
in length, and grown more and more technical in character. The
body of the law, in other words, both substantive and adjective,
is greater than ever before.
The questions dealt with by the court are more delicate, more
intricate, and, at least so far as the amounts involved are n-
cerned, more important than ever before. The conflict of author-
ity is greater than ever before.
But while the general average of intelligence is higher
than formerly, it is doubtful if the average juror of to-day is any
better acquainted with the complexities of the law and its admiri-
istration than his grandsire was. Indeed the reverse is probably
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true. That he is more impatient of jury service, more anxious
to get back to his own affairs and more addicted to a certain cock-
sureness of judgment than his forebears is certain.
Now the very function of the argument of counsel is to explain,
to the mind of the layman the principles of law embodied in the
instructions of the court and, in decent and logical fashion, to,
show the application of these principles to the facts of the case
on trial. The average man is averse to following blindly a rule
which he does not understand. Even if he attempts to do so, he
is extremely apt to err therein. The average juror serves in that
capacity but rarely. In many states, service within one year
entitles a juror to exemption at least until twelve months have
passed from the date of his last service. We have, therefore, no
experienced body of jurors upon which to draw. Yet upon the
conclusion of the average trial perhaps a dozen witnesses, in more
or less haphazard fashion, l ave told the various portions which go
to make up the whole of the evidence in the case. This process.
consumes usually not less than two days in doing so. The witnesses
are constantly interrupted by objections, and arguments of coun-
of the same facts. Upon the conclusion of this medley, there
is read to the jury a number of "instructions," supposed to be
applicable to every theory urged by the parties and to declare the
law as applicable to any state of facts which the jury may possibly-
find from the evidence to be true. These instructions also are
not set forth in ordinary, everyday language, but are couched irr
the form of "approved precedents," containing fine-spun distinc-
tions and dealing frequently with abstractions so shadowy that a
trained legal mind grasps 'them only after much labor. They-
vary in number and length, but are rarely less than half a dozen,
in number or less than half a page of typewritten matter on an,
average, each, in length. This is the minimum. There is little
or no maximum in practice despite the admonitions of appellate
tribunals.
Then follows the curt statement of the court: "Twenty minutes.
on' a side for argument." Even this brief space, however, must,
for one party and frequently is for both, broken into two frag-
ments of ten minutes each. Only he who has made the effort-
knows how futile it is to attempt anything like a logical or rational
application of any law to any facts within ten or twenty minutes.
The desire to crowd as much as possible into the time allowed
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calls forth a rapid speech, touching the salient points only, in
which law and facts are jumbled in one hurrying stream before
the minds of men of little training, and the so-called argument
is over. A foolish verdict follows-not so often as might nat-
urally be expected, it is true, but too often, and an appellate court
is called upon by the aggrieved litigant to review and reverse the
case in order that it may again be sent upon its chaotic journey
through the same maelstrom. As a result, the jury system is
denounced as archaic and is growing in unpopularity.
But suppose the case is taken up. Note what happens in the
appellate court. In the first place, the case is heard by a smaller
body of men, generally, perhaps, not more than three, and rarely
if ever more than nine in number, hence the probability of con-
flicting opinion is proportionately reduced.
Again, these men are men who are especially trained and pre-
sumably peculiarly fitted for the task in hand. All of the plead-
ings and all at least of the material evidence is beford them in
printed form. The arguments of counsel, without any limita-
tions other than those of good sense, are also before them in
printed form. The judges are left to take whatever time they
may deem necessary in which to review the bill of excep-
tions and the briefs and to refresh their minds again and
again as to their contents. Yet, in spite of all this, the time for
oral argument is rarely, if ever, limited to less than one hour on
each side, and it is by no means an uncommon thing for appellate
courts to permit or to order a case to be re-argued. Even after
all these precautions, opportunity is still given the losing party to.
file a printed petition for a rehearing and thus again to call to the
attention of the Court any matter of law or fact which the Court
inadvertently may have overlooked. Furthermore, it has been,.
I think, the experience of most lawyers, that the higher the appel-
late tribunal is in point of dignity, power and learning, the more-
apt it is, in the language of an eminent jurist now upon the bench
of a court of last resort, "to lean, as upon a staff, upon the argu-.
ment of counsel," to complain of the absence of briefs and to
advise and encourage oral argument. Indeed the bench has ever-
willingly availed itself of this assistance.
"If judges," said Lord Coleridge, "only would appreciate what
an invaluable assistance it is to their own minds, to listen to those
who have prepared their arguments and are perfectly familiar-
with the facts, they would recognize that initial listening, at alt
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events, is most desirable." By "initial listening," as the context
shows, the learned Lord Chief Justice referred to listening, at
least, at the beginning of the argument, without interruption.
Strange, is it not, that we should deny, in effect, to the unlearned
juror the aid which the learned judge so highly values?
There is another consideration, somewhat far afield, it is true,
from the main purpose of a trial or of an argument, yet not with-
out merit. To the average laymen the law is a mighty mystery.
Its rules are arbitrary rules, having, as he too 'frequently thinks,
no root in right reason, and its ways past finding out.
If reverence for the law is bred of a right understanding of it,
'and if it be a desirable thing that the law should be reverenced,
surely that time would not be wasted which capable and conscien-
tious lawyers might daily consume in pointing out the reason for
the law as applied to the facts of a given case and thus daily, in
some measure at least, educating the endless procession of juries
in an understanding of the reason and reasonableness of the laws
of the land.
Possibly, also, justice would be rendered somewhat more cer-
tain, unjust and foolish verdicts somewhat less frequent, trial by
jury be brought into somewhat better repute and the administra-
tion of the law be somewhat less blown upon than is at present the
case.
John L. Williamson.
Kansas City, iMo. March, 1912.
